This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that data from distinct markets can be pooled. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice and state transition probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution, and (iii) the conditional state distribution given an initial state. If the null cannot be rejected, then the data across markets can be pooled. A rejection of the null implies that the data cannot be pooled across markets. In a Monte Carlo study we find that the test based on the steady-state distribution performs well and has high power even with small numbers of markets and time periods. We apply the tests to the empirical study of Ryan (2012) that analyzes dynamics of the U.S. Portland Cement industry and assess if the single equilibrium assumption is supported by the data.
Introduction
This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to test the null hypothesis that data from distinct markets can be pooled. Data pooling is employed in a number of empirical applications of the two-step estimation methods for dynamic games recently developed.
1 These two-step estimators estimate players' policies and state transition probabilities in a first stage directly from the data as functions of observable state variables. The second stage conducts a search for the structural model parameters which best rationalize observed behaviors of players and state transitions using the first stage policy estimates as estimates for the equilibrium beliefs. A typical application may not have long time series data for a single market. Researchers are tempted to pool data from different markets (or games) to perform the first stage policy function estimation. To do so, researchers assume that the data are generated from a single and identical equilibrium in every market. This assumption has become popular in a number of recent papers. 2 To be more precise, the assumption commonly imposed requires that the game describing players' behavior is identical in all markets and that a single and identical equilibrium of that game is played in all markets. It also requires that the econometric model controls for all observable or unobservable market-level elements. A violation of the assumption results in inconsistent policy estimates and inconsistent structural parameter estimates. A violation of the assumption can arise because of equilibrium multiplicity. The single and identical equilibrium assumption may be very restrictive even if the markets are identical as multiplicity of equilibria is a well known feature inherent to games. Incorrectly imposing this assumption leads to erroneous inference.
We propose three tests of the null hypothesis that the data from distinct markets can be pooled. The first test compares directly the set of conditional choice or state transition probabilities estimated from the pooled (across markets) sample with the ones estimated from each market separately. The second test is based on the result that there is a unique steady-state distribution associated with a transition matrix of states under the assumption of communicating states. Based on this result, the second test compares the steady-state distribution estimated from the pooled sample with the one from each market. Our third test statistic is based on the conditional state distribution given the initial (observed) state. We contrast the observed relative frequencies of states to the theoretical predictions given the initial state. It turns out that the third test does not require several assumptions on Markov chains that are imposed for other tests. Each test has its own advantage.
A rejection of the null suggests that the data cannot be pooled. A violation can arise because: (i) multiple equilibria are played across markets; (ii) the game form describing players' behavior and interactions differs across markets; and (iii) the specified model is not sufficiently rich as it does not control for all observable or unobservable market-level heterogeneity adequately. It is difficult to distinguish these alternative explanations although we shall illustrate tests accounting for unobservable market-level heterogeneity as in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) in more detail below. Our test is aimed at checking the validity of the data pooling assumption commonly imposed in the literature. A rejection of the null points to an inconsistency of the first stage estimates that arises from pooling different markets. Naturally, since the framework of this paper nests single agent settings as a special case with only one player, our tests can also be thought of as testing whether data can be pooled in the single agent case.
To illustrate the finite sample performance of our tests, we first apply the tests to simulated data using an example of multiple equilibria in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Our tests, particularly the one based on the steady-state distribution, perform well and have high power even with small numbers of markets and time periods. We then apply our tests to the empirical study of Ryan (2012) that analyzes dynamics of the U.S. Portland Cement industry and test if his assumption of single equilibrium is supported by the data. We find that the null hypothesis of single equilibrium is rejected in the data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes tests of the pooling hypothesis in a general class of dynamic Markov games. Our tests may give a researcher guidance on whether she can pool different markets to estimate policy functions in the first stage. A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that one or more modeling assumption differs across markets. In the context of static games with incomplete information, de Paula and Tang (2011) propose a test of multiplicity of equilibria that requires conditional independence between players' actions. Since our tests exploit the panel structure of the data and rely on the way that the game and states evolve, our tests are fundamentally different from theirs. One notable difference is that while de Paula and Tang (2011) maintain the assumption of independent-across-players private shocks, we can allow for within-period correlation in players' actions and for unobserved state variables. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a class of general dynamic Markov games we work with and provides some background on Markov chains. Section 3 proposes several test statistics. In Sections 4 we conduct a Monte Carlo study to examine finite sample properties. Section 5 applies our tests to data of Ryan (2012) . Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains technical details.
Model
This section describes elements of a general dynamic Markov game with discrete time t = 1, 2, . . .. We focus on the description of players' state variables and actions. These states and actions are the observable outcome variables for some underlying dynamic game which we do not observe. We leave the details of the game unspecified. Instead we shall focus on testable implications of the observed outcomes. Our setting includes the single agent case as a special case when there is one agent per market. We first describe the framework which applies for all markets j = 1, . . . , M .
Players. A typical player is denoted by i = 1, . . . , N . The single agent case arises when N = 1. The number of players is fixed and does not change over time. Every period the econometrician observes a profile of states and actions described as follows.
States Actions. Each player chooses an action a t i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} in finite support. The decisions are made after the state is observed. The decisions can be made simultaneously or sequentially. The decision may also be taken after an idiosyncratic random utility (or a random profit shock) is observed. We leave the details of the decision process unspecified. Our specification encompasses the random-utility modeling assumptions, and allows for within-period correlation in the random utility component across actions and across players. The vector of joint actions in period t is denoted by a t = (a t 1 , . . . , a t N ) ∈ A = {0, 1, . . . , K} N whose cardinality is m a = (K + 1) N . We assume actions are publicly observed by all players and the econometrician.
Choice probability matrix. Let σ(a|s) = Pr{a t = a|s t = s} denote the conditional probability that an action profile a will be chosen conditionally on a state s. Throughout the paper, we assume that σ is time invariant and is conditionally independent from other past actions and states. The matrix of conditional choice probabilities is denoted by σ, which has dimension m s × (m a m s ). It consists of conditional probabilities σ(a|s) in row s, column (a, s), and zeros in row s, column (a, s ) with s = s.
State-action transition matrix. Let g(s |a, s) = Pr{s t+1 = s |a t = a, s t = s} denote the state-action transition probability that a state s is reached when the current action profile and state are given by (a, s). We also assume that g is time invariant and is conditionally independent from other past actions and states. We use the symbol G to denote the (m a m s ) × m s dimensional state-action transition matrix in which column s ∈ S consists of the vector of probabilities {g(s |a, s)} a∈A,s∈S .
State transition matrix. Under the above assumptions on σ and G, the state variables s t obey a (first-order) Markov chain with the (stationary) state transition matrix P = σG whose dimension is m s × m s . A typical element p(s |s) = a∈A σ(a|s)g(s |a, s) of P equals the probability that state s is reached when the current state is given by s. Hereafter we focus on the firstorder Markov chain. However, our testing procedures can be extended to higherorder Markov chains since higher-order Markov chains can be reformulated as first-order ones by modifying the state space (see, e.g., Billingsley, 1961) .
Limiting steady-state distribution. When the limit exists, let Q(s , s) = lim T →∞ T −1 T t=1 1{s t = s , s 0 = s} denote the long run proportion of time that the Markov chain P spends in state s when starting at the initial state s 0 = s, where 1{·} is the indicator function. Suppose the unconditional long run proportion of time Q(s ) = lim T →∞ T −1 T t=1 1{s t = s } that the Markov chain P spends in state s satisfies Q(·) = Q(·, s) for all initial states s. Then the m s dimensional row vector of probabilities Q = {Q(s)} s∈S is called the steady-state distribution of the Markov chain. Observe that the state space is finite and Q describes a multinomial distribution.
The properties of Markov chains are well known. We next describe some property useful for our purpose. To do so, we introduce the concept of communicating states.
Communicating states. We say that a state s is reachable from s if there exists an integer T so that the chain P will be at state s after T periods with positive probability. If s is reachable from s, and s is reachable from s , then the states s and s are said to communicate. Lemma 1. Suppose all states of the Markov chain P communicate.
3 Then the steady-state distribution Q exists and is unique. It satisfies Q(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S and Q = QP.
This lemma guarantees existence and uniqueness of the steady-state distribution and states that the long run proportion of time that the Markov chain P spends in state s is strictly positive for any state s ∈ S and the equation Q = QP must hold. A proof of the above properties is given in Levin, Peres and Wilmer (2009, Proposition 1.14 and Corollary 1.17) for example.
Communicating states are typically invoked in applied work, see Ericson and Pakes (1995) . Communicating states naturally emerge in dynamic discrete choice models using a random utility specification, see McFadden (1973) . The random component having full support in the real numbers implies that all actions arise with strictly positive probability for any state s ∈ S. Thus, states will communicate if the state-action transition matrix allows that state s , or s, can in principle be reached when starting from state s, respectively s , for any pair of states s, s ∈ S.
The feature that all states communicate may also emerge when actions are chosen with probability one for some (or all) states. Our set-up includes these settings as well. What is required for states to communicate in this case is that there exists a sequence of state-action profiles {(a 1 , s
Tests of poolability
This section describes hypotheses that we aim at testing and proposes statistical tests for those hypotheses. For each market j, a sequence of action-state profiles (a t j , s t j ) t=1,...,T is observed, where T is the length of time periods in the data set. Our null hypothesis is that the observed profiles are generated from an identical data generating process in all markets, and the alternative is that the data generating process is distinct for some markets. Based on the set-up described in the previous section, the data generating process of the profiles (a t j , s t j ) t=1,...,T is characterized by the conditional choice probability matrix σ j and state-action transition matrix G j that imply the transition matrix of states P j = σ j G j . In particular, we focus on homogeneity of σ j and P j across markets, and test the following null hypotheses:
and the alternatives are their negations. The null hypothesis H σ 0 is based on the idea that the equilibrium choice probabilities are identical across markets. The null H P 0 has a similar motivation given that the state-action transition is identical across markets. Economic models may have the feature that the stateaction transition matrix G is exogenously given and by construction identical across markets. In such cases, testing the conditional choice probabilities has the same interpretation to testing the state transition probabilities. However, in general, the tests may not be equivalent. A rejection of the null H P 0 could arise either because of non-identical choice probabilities σ j or because of heterogeneous state-action transition matrices G j . Which test is most suitable depends on the economic application at hand and each test has its own rationale.
If all states of the Markov chain P communicate, then by Lemma 1, there exists a unique steady-state distribution Q and the identical equilibrium hypothesis may be tested by homogeneity of the steady-state distribution,
As discussed in the next subsection, if the cardinality of the action or state space is large, then the power of the test for H σ 0 or H P 0 tends to be low relative to that for H Q 0 because a decrease in the degrees of freedom can be expected. Thus, the power of the homogeneity test can be increased by testing the steady-state distribution.
Lemma 1 says that the null H P 0 of equal transition matrices implies the null H Q 0 of equal steady-state distributions. Thus, a rejection of H Q 0 provides a strong evidence for a rejection of H P 0 . By testing H Q 0 first, we may exploit the property that the power of testing the null H Q 0 is typically higher than the power of testing the null H P 0 . However, it should be noted that the converse is not true: the equivalence of the steady-state distribution across markets does not necessarily imply that of the transition matrix.
To test the above hypotheses, we consider the situation where for each market j, we observe the action-state profiles (a t j , s t j ) t=1,...,T with sufficiently large T . The test procedures discussed in the next subsection are theoretically justified when the time length T increases to infinity. However, the researcher may face the situation where the length of time periods T is relatively short compared to the number of markets M . In such a scenario, it would be natural to treat the action-state profiles with fixed T across markets as an i.i.d. sample (over j = 1, . . . , M ) from the distribution parametrized by a common choice probability σ or a common transition matrix P. For example, testing may be based on the conditional state distribution s t |s 1 = s given the initial state s for t = 2, . . . , T . By conditioning on the initial state we do not require that states communicate so that the industry at hand can reach the steady-state distribution. This situation arises naturally in new or growing industries. Using the transition matrix P, the conditional distribution s t |s 1 = s is described by ι s P t , where ι s takes one at the element corresponding to s and zero otherwise. There are many ways to compare the vector of conditional probabilities {Pr{s t = s |s 1 = s}} s ∈S with the theoretical prediction ι s P t . For example, at a given initial state s, we can consider the null hypothesis in the form of
The left hand side denotes the empirical frequency (across markets) of visiting state s in periods t = 2, . . . , T conditional on the initial state s 1 = s. The right hand side is the theoretical predicted counterpart under the null of homogeneity across markets. A violation of (3) would indicate that the empirical frequency distribution (across markets) differs from the one predicted by the theoretical model. Hypothesis (3) focuses on the average probabilities of visiting each state given the initial state s. We may do so for selected initial states. Alternatively, one may consider all possible initial states jointly by testing the null H 0 : Pr{s t = s |s 1 = s} = ι s P t for all s ∈ S and t or its linear combinations. We note that the null H 
Testing choice and transition probabilities
Let us first consider testing for H σ 0 and H P 0 in (1) based on the conditional choice and transition probabilities, respectively. We form a generally applicable chisquared test statistic based on the conditional choice or transition probability, that is
where P j (d) is a nonparametric estimator of the probability of interest for a market j without imposing the null hypothesis of interest, P (d) is another non-parametric estimator under the null of homogeneity of P j (d) across markets, and t j = s} be the frequency of state s in market j. Then we estimate the conditional choice probabilities for the action profile a given the current state s in market j, σ j (a|s), by the relative frequencies
with and without imposing H σ 0 , respectively. To obtain the chi-squared limiting distribution, we set the weight as
Also, to test the equivalence of the transition matrices H
Then we estimate the transition probability p j (s |s) by
with and without imposing H P 0 , respectively. The weight is set as
The limiting null distribution of the statistic T P is obtained in the following proposition (see Appendix A.1 for the proof). For example, to test the null H P 0 , we can randomly pick an initial state s 0 ∈ S and then draw the bootstrap counterpart f (6) for s, s ∈ S, j = 1, . . . , M , and b = 1, . . . , B. Note that we start the sampling process only after a certain number of time periods in order to neutralize the effect of the arbitrary choice of the initial state. Then the bootstrap counterpart T b P of the statistic T P is given by replacing f j (s), respectively. Also, to test the null H σ 0 , we can use the fact that action profiles a ∈A conditional on a state s ∈ S are multinomially distributed with probabilities σ j (a|s) in market j. State s ∈ S occurs with frequency f j (s) and the probability of observing action state profiles (a, s) from f j (s) trials is given by the multinomial
for each j = 1, . . . , M . We can use this distribution to implement a parametric bootstrap. More precisely, we fix s ∈ S and draw the bootstrap counterpart {f b j (a, s)} a∈A of {f j (a, s)} a∈A for b = 1, . . . , B from the multinomial distribution with the number of trials f j (s) and the weight vector { P (a, s)} a∈A in (5) . Then the bootstrap counterpart T Similarly, to test the null H P 0 on the transition matrices, we draw a bootstrap counterpart {f
with the number of trials f 1 j (s) and weight vector { P (s , s)} s ∈S in (6) . Then the bootstrap counterpart T b P is given by replacing f
Optimal test statistic. The test statistic T P is constructed by measuring the chi-squared distance between the nonparametric estimators P (d) and P j (d) for the discrete distribution over D with and without imposing the null hypothesis, respectively. There are many other ways to measure the discrepancy between the single market and full-sample estimates. For example, we can measure discrepancy of conditional probabilities by the (weighted) Kullback-Leibler divergence
In order to test the null hypothesis H σ 0 on the conditional choice probabilities, we can set as d = (a, s) and D = A × S and estimate P j (d) and P (d) as in (5) . Also, to test the null hypothesis H P 0 on the transition probabilities, we set as d = (s , s) and D = S × S and then estimate P j (d) and P (d) as in (6) . For both cases, we set the weight as W j (d) = f j (s) to obtain the chi-squared limiting distribution. The test statistic T * P is a likelihood-ratio version of the chi-squared statistic T P . These statistics are asymptotically equivalent under the null and local alternative hypotheses (e.g. van der Vaart, 1998, Lemma 17.3).
On the other hand, in the literature of hypothesis testing for multinomial distributions, Hoeffding (1965) discovered that the likelihood ratio statistic for the simple hypothesis on multinomials enjoys some global power optimality which is not shared by the chi-squared statistic. In particular, under some restriction on the convergence rate of the type I error probability, the likelihood ratio statistic achieves the highest power under fixed alternatives. This optimality is called the generalized Neyman-Pearson optimality and has been extended to several contexts (see, Gutman, 1989) . By extending the argument in Gutman (1989) to our set-up, we derive the following optimality for T * P (see Appendix A.2 for the proof). 
for α > 0, and that for any test statistic
it holds Pr{T *
for all T large enough. Also the same result holds for the statistic T * P with W j (d) = f j (s) and (6) This proposition says that in the class of test statistics satisfying the restriction on the exponential decay rate of the type I error probability in (9), the Kullback-Leibler statistic T * P attains the highest power. This optimality result is a natural extension of the generalized Neyman-Pearson optimality analysis to homogeneity testing of conditional choice or transition probabilities.
Parametric model for σ and P. Suppose we parametrize the choice probability σ j or transition matrix P j by a parametric model σ(a|s; θ j ) or p(s, s ; θ j ), such as logit. We assume that the functional forms are identical across markets and the different equilibria are characterized by different parameter values of θ j . In this case, the null hypothesis of interest can be written as
Since this is a parameter hypothesis for a discrete parametric model, standard maximum likelihood theory applies. In particular, the score test would be convenient since the test statistic requires only the full sample estimator.
Large number of markets M . The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic T P is derived under the assumption that the number of markets M is fixed. However, there are some cases where M is large relative to the length of time T ; e.g., Collard-Wexler (2013) and Dunne, Klimek, Roberts and Xu (2013). When M is large, it may be useful to investigate the limiting behavior of the statistic T P as both M and T diverge to infinity. Let {M T } be a sequence satisfying M T → ∞ and M T /T → 0 as T → ∞. In this case, intuitively, the degree of freedom for the limiting distribution of T P grows to infinity. Thus after standardization, the limiting distribution of T P is characterized by the standard normal. For example, the test statistic for H σ 0 based on (5) satisfies
Comparison with de Paula and Tang (2011). Note that our test can allow for within-period correlation. In the context of static games with incomplete information, de Paula and Tang (2011) test conditional independence between players' actions to check if there are more than one equilibria in the data generating process. This test relies on the assumption of independent-across-players actions conditional on state variables. For example, this may arise if there is a utility component in payoffs unobserved by the econometrician but known to players. Our test is more flexible and permits within-period correlation in players' actions conditional on state variables. The permissible information structure and set of games our framework can deal with is more general. Our tests explore the way that the game and states evolve and require repeated observations for each market. 
Testing steady-state distribution
We now consider testing of H Q 0 in (2), which examines the steady-state distribution in individual markets and compares it to the average (across markets) steady-state distribution. Under the null hypothesis of identical steady-state distributions, the market specific and average market distributions are close to each other. The test statistic is more intuitive in the sense that it compares two steady-state distributions directly. However, the test requires that the steadystate distributions exist and that the Markov chain is in the steady-state, see Lemma 1. That is, regardless of which hypothesis is true, we assume that all states in the chain P j communicate for all markets j. The relative frequencies Q j = {T −1 f j (s)} s∈S are nonparametric estimates of the steady-state distribution Q j . By Billingsley (1961, Theorem 3.3), the limiting distribution of Q j is obtained as
where the asymptotic variance V j is defined in Appendix A.3. Since rank(V j ) = m s − 1, we can obtain a test statistic for H Q 0 as
under H Q 0 , where
j=1 Q j and V − means a generalized inverse of V, which is defined in Appendix A.3. Although this statistic validates the use of the chi-squared critical value for the asymptotic test, the estimator V may not be easy to compute and requires a bandwidth choice. Thus in our simulation and empirical studies below, we replace V in (12) To develop a test for this case we consider the conditional state distribution given the initial state. We assume that the number of markets M is large (and the length of time periods T can be short).
To describe a suitable test statistic, we treat the state profiles across markets as an i.i.d. sample from the distribution parametrized by the transition matrix P, and propose a test for the null hypothesis H s 0 in (3). Let P be the frequency estimator of the state transition matrix based on the whole state profiles. Also
be the relative frequency estimator for the vector of conditional probabilities Pr{s t = s |s 1 = s} s ∈S for t = 2, . . . , T for a given initial state s. If our model parametrized by P is correct, the contrast between Q t s and ι s P t should be close to zero for all t = 2, . . . , T . We evaluate the contrast C s = (T − 1)
. The test statistic satisfies (12), the estimator V s may not be easy to compute. Thus in our simulation and empirical studies below, we replace V s in (13) with the identity matrix and employ some bootstrap critical value.
Relationships among test statistics
The three test statistics provided in the previous subsections have different advantages depending on the application and the type of data. Given that in 5 We can also consider the hypothesis
Under H s,T 0 , the Wald statistic for this hypothesis will converge to χ 2 (T (ms − 1)) as M → ∞ with fixed T . Also its normalized version converges to the standard normal distribution as
standard dynamic discrete models, player's behavior is described in the form of conditional choice probabilities, the test based on H σ 0 (T P and T * P using (5)) would be a natural starting point. It is also reasonable to use the test based on H P 0 . Under the assumption that G j is identical for all markets j, testing H P 0 plays a similar role to testing H σ 0 . In general, however, rejecting the null H P 0 may also arise because of differences in G j even if H σ 0 holds. Poolability can also be tested by the null hypothesis H Q 0 using the steadystate distribution test statistic T Q . Since the dimension of the hypothesis decreases, we expect it to have higher power compared to T P . It should also be emphasized, however, that there is a region where poolability is violated but the test based on T Q is not able to detect. Put differently, if the test based on T Q rejects the null hypothesis H Q 0 , we would reject the null of poolability; on the other hand, if it does not rejects the null, there may still be multiple equilibria or some misspecification that would invalidate pooling (as two distinct transition matrices may yield the same steady-state distribution). Therefore, we recommend the following procedure in practice. First, the test of H There are also situations where states do not communicate or initial conditions matter. In such cases, the conditional state distribution test T s can be used. It is also worth emphasizing that T s is suitable when M becomes large, while T is fixed (i.e., short panel). Some empirical applications in IO have this data structure; e.g., Collard-Wexler (2013) and Dunne, Klimek, Roberts and Xu (2013). Based on these estimates, we obtain an estimator of P, sayP. Then we can apply the test statistic T s in (13) by replacing P withP, i.e., Third, we illustrate how to extend the test for H P 0 in (1) to accommodate unobservable time-invariant state variables. Again, for simplicity of exposition suppose s 2 is binary. We can modify the null hypothesis as H P 0 : s j is a Markov chain from P (a) or P (b) for all j.
Unobservable state variables
As M → ∞, we can consistently estimate P (a) and P (b) using the pooled sample across markets by applying Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) or Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) . LetP (a) andP (b) be such estimators. On the other hand, as T → ∞, the estimatorP j defined in (6) consistently estimates the transition for each market j and thus converges to P (a) or P (b) underH P 0 . Based on these observations, a test statistic forH P 0 may be constructed asT P = M j=1T P,j , whereT
This construction of the test statistic (i.e., aggregate the statisticT P,j over crosssection units j = 1, . . . , M ) appears often in the literature of large-T panel data analysis (see, e.g., Baltagi, 2008, ch. 12) . In this literature, it is common to take the sequential limits (i.e., take T → ∞ first to derive the limiting distribution ofT P,j for each j, and then take M → ∞ to establish the limiting distribution ofT P ) to analyze the asymptotic properties of test statistics, such as panel unit root tests. Phillips and Moon (1999) provided additional requirements to strengthen the sequential limit theory to the joint one, where T and M can grow in an arbitrary way. However, in our setup, the statisticT P,j for market j depends on both M (forP (a) andP (b) ) and T (for P j (s)). Therefore, the existing techniques of large-T panel data analysis are not directly applicable. Although the complete analysis of the asymptotic theory forT P is beyond the scope of this paper, we can adjust the construction of the test statistic to fit into the sequential asymptotic framework. To this end, we choose the sample size to estimateP (a) andP (b) as a function of T , say C T . Also we assume C T /T → ∞ as T → ∞, which guarantees that the estimation errorsP
are typically computed by a pooled sample across markets, the requirement C T /T → ∞ is mild. Under these additional requirements, the statisticT P,j depends only on T and satisfies
for every j. Therefore, we can obtain the limiting distribution ofT P = M j=1T P,j under the sequential limit, i.e.,
as T → ∞ followed by M → ∞ sequentially. This sequential limiting result may be strengthened to the joint one by verifying additional conditions in Phillips and Moon (1999, Lemma 6).
Monte Carlo
This section examines the practical aspects of the proposed tests in a Monte Carlo study. We consider a simple and transparent dynamic oligopoly game with multiple equilibria. The game was illustrated and analyzed in more detail in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). It has the following features. There are two players, binary actions a t i ∈ {0, 1}, and binary states s t i ∈ {0, 1}. The distribution of the profitability shocks is the standard normal. The discount factor is fixed at 0.9. The state transition law is given by s t+1 i = a t i . Period payoffs are symmetric and parametrized as follows:
where π 1 = 1.2; and π 2 = −1.2. The period payoffs can be interpreted as stemming from a game with switching costs and/or as entry/exit game. A player that selects action 1 receives monopoly profits π 1 if she is the only active player, and she receives duopoly profits π 2 otherwise. Additionally, a player that switches states from 0 to 1 incurs the entry cost 0.2; while a player that switches from 1 to 0 receives the exit value 0.1.
Multiplicity. The game illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria which is a feature inherent to games. The following analysis focuses on two asymmetric equilibria of the three equilibria described in Pesendorfer and SchmidtDengler (2008). In equilibrium (i), player two is more likely to choose action 0 than player one in all states. The ex ante probability vectors for both players are given by σ(a 1 = 0|s 1 , s 2 ) = (0.27, 0.39, 0.20, 0.25), σ(a 2 = 0|s 2 , s 1 ) = (0.72, 0.78, 0.58, 0.71), where the order of the elements in the probability vectors corresponds to the state vector (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
In equilibrium (ii), player two is more likely to choose action 0 than player one in all states with the exception of state (1, 0). The probability vectors are given by σ(a 1 = 0|s 1 , s 2 ) = (0.38, 0.69, 0.17, 0.39), σ(a 2 = 0|s 2 , s 1 ) = (0.47, 0.70, 0.16, 0.42).
Design. The simulated data are generated by randomly drawing a time series of actions from the calculated equilibrium choice probabilities described above for each of the equilibria (i)-(ii) respectively. The initial state is taken as (0, 0) and we start the sampling process after 100 periods. The number of markets and the length of the time series is varied in the experiment with the aim at staying close to typical industry applications. We choose M = 20, 40, . . . , 640 and T = 5, 10, . . . , 640. The parameter λ denotes the fraction of markets that adopt equilibrium (i) while 1 − λ denotes the fraction of markets that adopt equilibrium (ii).
Implementation. The Monte Carlo study considers the conditional choice probability multiplicity test by T P , its optimal version by T * P , the steady-state distribution test by T Q , and the conditional state distribution test by T s as described in Section 3. In this example, a t = s t+1 and the state transition probabilities P equal the conditional choice probabilities σ. Therefore, the null hypotheses H σ 0 and H P 0 and their tests are identical. To implement T P in (4) and T * P in (7), we employ the formula in (6). 6 The steady-state probabilities Q are estimated by the relative frequencies. For the steady-state distribution test by T Q , we use the identity matrix for the variance matrix in (12) . For the conditional state distribution test by T s , we consider the sum T S = s∈S T s instead of focusing on a particular initial state. To compute T s , we replace the variance matrix V s in (13) with the identity matrix.
The critical values of these test statistics are calculated using a bootstrap procedure. For every bootstrap iteration b, we simulate choice/state profiles {s b j } from the transition matrix based on P (d) defined in (6) for every market j. For the first three tests (i.e., the tests by T P , T * P , and T Q ), as in the data generating process, the initial state is taken as (0, 0) and we start the sampling process after 100 periods. For the test by T s , for each market, we use the same initial state as is observed in the simulated sample and start the game from that state. The bootstrap counterparts of the test statistics are calculated for b = 1, . . . , B. The critical values are obtained by the 95th percentile of the bootstrapped statistics.
Results. The experiment is based on B = 999 repetitions for the bootstrap sample and 1, 000 Monte Carlo repetitions. Tables 1-4 report the results of the experiments. These tables report the percentages of rejections of our tests for selected values of M , T , and λ.
We first study the size properties of our tests. Tables 1 and 2 consider the cases of λ = 1 and λ = 0, respectively. For these cases, there is a unique equilibrium and the null hypotheses are satisfied. All tests perform reassuringly well leading to a five percent rejection frequency as T and/or M increase.
We next assess the power properties of our tests. Table 3 considers the case of λ = 0.5, where the first and second equilibria arise with equal probability. It shows that as the number of time periods T and/or markets M increases, all the tests typically reject the null more frequently. The two conditional choice probability tests (T P and T * P ) and the steady-state distribution test (T Q ) perform better than the conditional state distribution test (T s ) for moderate values of M (e.g., M = 20 or 40). When M becomes large (M = 320 or 640), T s dominates T P and T * P especially when T is relatively small. Comparing the conditional choice probability tests and the steady-state distribution test, we find that T Q performs better than T P and T * P . A possible reason is that T Q uses fewer cells than T P and T * P . T Q is based on m s cells while T P and T * P are based on (m s m a ) cells. Table 3 also illustrates that for a typical industry application with about 40 markets and 20 time periods the performance of T Q is satisfying. Also the test by T P and the optimal test by T * P have similar performance. For a better comparison based on the result in Proposition 2, we compute the size-adjusted power for T P and T * P . We find that the size-adjusted power for T * P is higher than that for T P in most cases. 7 To further investigate the power properties of these tests, Table 4 considers the case of λ = 0.9. That is, the first equilibrium is played in 90% of M markets. While all the tests have lower power than in Table 3 , the relative performances of these tests appear the same. T Q has still the best performance among all tests.
Overall, our Monte Carlo illustrates that the steady-state distribution test by T Q performs well for moderate sample sizes of T and M . It seems well suited 7 For example, when M = 40, T = 20, and λ = 0.5, Table 3 suggests that the power for T P is higher than the power for T * P . On the other hand, the size-adjusted power for T P is 16.1, while the size-adjusted power for T * P is 21.8.
for typical industry applications.
We also check the performance ofTs andT P using the following simple simulation design. Suppose there are only two states. Consider the following three state transition matrices:
Under the null, each market follows P (a) or P (b) with equal probability. Under the alternative, each market follows P (a) or P (b) with probability of 0.25, and follows P (c) with probability of 0.5. We compute the size and power of the two test statistics with varying numbers of markets and time periods. Overall, the size approaches 5 percent quickly for both statistics. For the power,T P performs better thanTs. For example, the power ofT P when (M = 500, T = 10), (M = 500, T = 30), and (M = 500, T = 50) is 9.3, 80.1, and 99.7 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the corresponding figures forTs are 5.0, 7.0, and 9.1 percent, respectively. The details of this exercise are available upon request. 
Empirical Application
Recently, a number of empirical papers apply a dynamic game to data and estimate parameters of the game using two step methods. These papers include Ryan (2012), Collard-Wexler (2013), Sweeting (2013), Beresteanu, Ellickson and Misra (2010), and the empirical section of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), among others. Panel data frequently contain a number of markets over a relatively short time period. Researchers tend to pool different markets together to estimate policy functions in the first stage. To do this pooling, an important assumption is that a single equilibrium is played in every market. This section tests the poolability hypothesis using the data of Ryan (2012). We chose Ryan (2012) because it is one of a few papers already published and because the number of state variables is relatively small so that it fits well our illustrative purpose.
To evaluate the welfare costs of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act on the Portland cement industry in the U.S., Ryan (2012) develops a dynamic oligopoly model based on Ericson and Pakes (1995) and estimates the model using a two-step method developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) . In his application, there are 23 geographically separated markets. To estimate firms' policy functions in the first stage, Ryan (2012) assumes that the data are generated by a single Markov Perfect Equilibrium. We apply our test to check this assumption. One caveat is that we use a discrete state space framework, while Ryan (2012) uses a continuous state space. Thus, we have to discretize the state variables in Ryan (2012)'s application to perform the test. For a fine grid, however, little differences between the two frameworks are expected in practice.
We first summarize Ryan (2012)'s model. Then, we explain the procedure of our test in this context. Ryan (2012) assumes that N firms play a dynamic oligopoly game in each regional cement market. Firms make decisions to maximize the discounted sum of expected profits. The timing of the decisions is as follows. At the beginning of each period, incumbent firms draw a private scrap value and decides whether to exit the market or not. Then, potential entrants receive a private draw of entry costs and investment costs. At the same time, incumbent firms who have not decided to exit the market draw private costs of investment and divestment. Then, all entry and investment decisions are made simultaneously. Firms compete in the product market and profits realize. Finally, firms enter and exit, and their capacity levels change according to the investment/divestment decisions in this period.
Ryan (2012)'s model
Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S be the capacity levels of N firms and let ε i be a vector of all private shocks to firm i. Assuming that ε i is iid over time and focusing on pure Markovian strategies, firm i's strategy is a mapping from states and private shocks to actions. The game payoff for firm i is defined as the discounted sum of expected period payoffs given the beliefs now and in the future. The collection of strategies and beliefs is a MPE if (i) for all i, firm i's strategy is a best response to its rivals' strategies given the beliefs at all states s ∈ S and (ii) for all i, the beliefs of firm i are consistent with the strategies. The existence of pure strategy equilibria in a class of dynamic games is provided in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) . The model of Ryan (2012) also falls in this class. Furthermore, multiplicity of equilibria is prevalent.
Ryan (2012) follows the two-step method developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) . In the first stage, Ryan (2012) estimates the entry, exit, and investment policies as a function of states. Because of the issue of multiplicity, different equilibria may be played in different markets. However, since Ryan (2012) has only 19 years of time series compared to a large state space, estimating policy functions market by market is not practical. Thus, he imposes the following assumption:
The same equilibrium is played in all markets.
Based on this assumption Ryan pools all markets when estimating policy functions. Our aim is to test the validity of this assumption.
In addition to Assumption 1, Ryan (2012) assumes flexible functional forms for the policy functions. First, the probability of entry is modeled as a probit regression, Pr{firm i enters in period t| s i = 0, s}
where Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal. The dummy 1{t > 1990} is introduced to account for the change in firms' behavior after the introduction of the 1990 Amendments. Second, the exit probability is also modeled as probit,
Finally, the investment policy is modeled using the empirical model of the (S,s) rule by Attanasio (2000) . Specifically, firms adjust the current capacity level to a target level of capacity when current capacity exceeds one of the bands around the target level. The target level s * t i is given by ln s * t
where u * t i is iid normal with zero mean and a homoscedastic variance, the functions b 1 (·) and b 2 (·) denote cubic b-spline, which is to capture flexible functional forms in the variables s t i and j =i s t j , respectively. The lower and upper bands are given by (19) and . To estimate parameters in (19) and (20), Ryan (2012) 
. The implicit assumption here is that the level of capacity observed before the change (i.e., s t i ) is equal to either the lower or the upper bands depending on whether the investment is positive or negative. 9 To estimate the variances of u * t i , u bt i , and u bt i , Ryan (2012) calculates the sum of the squared residuals at the estimated parameters and divide it by (n − k λ ), where n is the sample size used in least squares and k λ is the number of parameters in λ for each equation.
Once all these parameters are estimated, the value functions can be computed by forward simulation. If Assumption 1 holds and the functional forms are flexible enough, the first stage delivers consistent estimates of choice probabilities associated with the equilibrium that is played in the data. However, if there are more than one equilibria in the data, estimates of choice probabilities are not consistent, and estimates of structural parameters in the second stage are not consistent either.
The model specified above implies the Markov transition probability P and the corresponding steady-state distribution Q. Although Ryan (2012) uses a parametric specification in his first stage estimate for the feasibility reason, we apply our test directly to P and Q. It is a major advantage of our tests that the model's details do not have to be specified.
Data
We download the data from the Econometrica webpage. The dataset contains information on all the Portland cement plants in the United States from 1980 to 1998. Following Ryan (2012), we assume that every plant is owned by different firms. For each plant, we observe the name of company that owns the plant and the location of the plant. A plant consists of several kilns. For each kiln, we observe the fuel type, process type, and the year when the kiln was installed. We organize the data in the following way. The capacity of a plant is simply defined as the sum of capacity of all kilns that are installed in the plant. Plants sometimes change their company name. One reason is that plants are sold to a different company. Another possibility is that two or more firms merge and names change accordingly. In such cases, it appears as if the old plant exits the market and a new firm (plant) enters the market at the same time. To deal with such spurious entry/exit, we check information of kilns (fuel type, process type, year of installation) installed in the plant that changed the company name, and 9 For an interpretation and justification of this implicit assumption, see Attanasio (2000) .
if those information have not changed at all, we assume that the plant stays in the market (we assume that no entry and exit took place associated with this name change).
As a result, we obtained the same plant-level data as Ryan (2012) . Table 5 shows its summary statistics. 10 Since our Monte Carlo study indicates that the steady-state distribution test by T Q performs better than the other tests when the number of markets is small, we first apply the steady-state distribution test to Ryan (2012)'s data. Then to account for the possibility that poolability is violated but the test based on T Q is not able to detect, we also apply the state transition probability test by T P and its optimal version T * P . For the sake of completeness, we apply the test based on T s as well. The original state space of Ryan (2012) consists of firm-level capacities. We focus on a lower-dimensional state variable consisting of the total market-level capacity s Our test proceeds as follows. Ryan (2012) assumed that the same equilibrium was played in all markets before 1990 and that another identical equilibrium was played in all markets after 1990. We test these hypotheses in different time periods by the statistics T Q , T P , T * P , and T s . To implement these tests, we discretize the support of s t j into 50 bins with equal intervals of 250 thousand tons (0-250 thousand tons, 250-500 thousand tons, and so on). Figure 1 depicts the discretized state distributions before and after 1990. 10 Ryan (2012)'s Java code available at the Econometrica website generates only 22 markets, while his first-stage estimation appears to be using 23 markets (23 markets times 18 years equals 414 observations). One natural way to increase the number of markets is to disaggregate one large market into two. In California, we can observe two clusters of plants; one in Northern California around the San Francisco area and another in Southern California around the Los Angeles area. These two clusters are remote by more than 350 miles. Thus, we believe that Northern and Southern California can be considered two separate markets. Then the test statistic T Q is obtained as
for l = {before, after}. Also for d = (s , s) ∈ {1, . . . , 50} 2 , the state transition probabilities are estimated by and P before (d) and P after (d) are defined as in (6) . The test statistic T P is obtained as
where
The test statistic T * P is given by
Finally, the test statistic T s is defined accordingly as in (13) . (21), (22) and (23), respectively. For the test by T s , all steps are the same as other tests. The number of bootstrap iterations is B = 999. Table 6 summarizes the test results. T P and T * P imply that we reject the poolability hypothesis at the 1% significance level for the period before 1990 and at the 10% significance level for the period after 1990. The fact that the test by T Q does not reject the null, while the tests by T P and T * P reject it may suggest that distinct conditional choice probabilities have similar (or perhaps identical) steady-state distributions. The result of the test by T s may be because the power is low under the current sample size.
To perform the above tests, we implicitly assume that the relevant state variable is firm-level cement capacity only. However, regional markets differ significantly in their size. Therefore, the rejection of the null hypothesis of poolability may simply have come from the large amount of observable heterogeneity. To capture such market-level heterogeneity, we control for the size of population of each market following Ryan (2012) .
12 Specifically, we calculate the average (over 19 time periods) population size by market, and divide 23 markets into 7 "small" markets, 8 "medium" markets, and 8 "large" markets. For each of these subgroups of markets, we apply the tests by T P and T * P . Table 7 summarizes the results of the tests on subgroups of markets. This suggests that while our tests do not reject the hypothesis H P 0 of poolability for small and medium markets, they still reject the null hypothesis for the group of large markets, especially for the period before 1990.
Finally, we useT s in (14) andT P in (15) to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity. The parameters inP, that is, π and the elements in P (a) and P (b) are estimated by the MLE. To compute the critical value, the parametric bootstrap is employed as before. Table 8 summarizes the results. The upper panel of the table shows the test results based on the full sample. The tests based on transition probability matrices do not reject the null of poolability across markets at the 5% significance level. However, if we control for the size of population, a slightly different picture emerges. The lower panel shows the test results when we focus on the subsample of large markets. As in Table 7 , the test based onT P rejects the null hypothesis of poolability at the 5% significance level for the period before 1990. In addition, the test based onT s supports the same conclusion. Our result suggests that the data should not be pooled even if a researcher accounts for two unobservable market types and uses an appropriate method (e.g., Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011 ). Since we assume that unobserved heterogeneity follows a finite-mixture model with only two components, the rejection of our tests may point to the existence of more general types of unobserved heterogeneity, the presence of multiple equilibria within a group of markets of the same type, or both. One caveat is that the size of the tests may not have converged quickly enough. Therefore, given the small sample size in this application, our results should be treated as suggestive.
Conclusion
This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that the data from distinct markets can be pooled. The tests are based on the conditional choice and state transition probabilities, the steady-state distribution, and the conditional state distribution. We perform a Monte Carlo study and find that the steady-state distribution test works well and has high power even with a small number of markets and time periods. We apply our tests to the empirical application of Ryan (2012) and reject the null hypothesis of poolability.
Two caveats need to be emphasized. First, in case of rejection, researchers may be tempted to apply the tests repeatedly to subsamples until the null hypothesis is no longer rejected. While this exercise may be informative for identifying the cause of the rejection, it is not statistically justified. In general, if the same test is applied to the subsample after a rejection based on the full sample, the test statistic should be modified to incorporate the fact that the test rejects the null with the full sample. Such a sequential testing procedure would involve more sophisticated statistical theory and is beyond the scope of our paper. Second, our test statistics are proposed within the finite state discrete time Markov class. The theory of finite state Markov chains is well developed and allows us to borrow well known results from the probability theory literature. To extend the tests to a richer state space, we would need to borrow results from a more involved statistical literature making the tests perhaps less accessible to researchers. However, we believe that our tests cover a wide class of dynamic games that are used in the empirical IO literature. With a bounded state space, as is typical the case in IO applications, the observable difference between games with finite state and games with a continuous state space seem superficial and not essential as in practice the data are finite. Researchers may use a finer grid when the data become richer.
1/2 . Thus, a similar argument yields the conclusion.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the optimality for T * P to test H 
where the first inequality follows from the set inclusion relationship, the second inequality follows from the facts that at least half of elements of Λ l is contained in Ω R (due to Λ l ⊂Ω R ) and that all elements in Λ l occur with same probability, and the equality follows from independence of (ω 1 , . . . 
where q j,l (·, ·) is the two-period joint empirical measure given by the type Λ l,j , p(·, ·) is the two-period joint measure given by P , and K(q j,l , p) = 
for some δ 1T = O(T −1 log T ). Here p is the common joint measure under H 
for any l satisfying Λ l ⊂Ω R and all T large enough, where the first inequality follows from (9), the equality follows from independence of (ω 1 , . . . , ω M ) and Λ l = Λ l,1 × · · · × Λ M and the fact thatΩ R depends only on the types, and the second inequality follows from (27) . Thus, if the rejection byΩ R occurs, then the observed empirical joint empirical measure {q j } j=1,...M satisfies (29) and setting p as the joint empirical measure q total (·, ·) = Then by the definition of K(·, ·), the test statistic is written as
Let Ω * R be the rejection region of the test 1{T * P ≥ 2(T − 1)(α − δ 4T )}. Also, let q 
